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STATE OF NEW YORK- BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name: Gordon, Christopher Facility: Bare Hill CF 
NYSID: 
DIN: 16-B-1506 
Appearances: 
Decision appealed: 
Board Member(s) 
who participated: 
Papers considered: 
Chery 1 L. Kates, Esq. 
P.O. Box 734 
Appeal 
Control No.: 
Fairport, New York 14450 
07-110-18 B 
July 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 months. 
Smith, Cruse, Agostini 
Appellant's Brief received January 30, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
. Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. · 
Final Determination: Th~ undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
-~~~· ~~med _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
Commissioner 
~ 
_/ 
_ Affirmed 
~d 
_Vacated, remanded for de novo mtervl•1-· Modified to 
_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ M~ified to ___ _ 
If the Final etermination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of.Appeals Unit, written 
reasons fo the Parole Board's determination!!!!!!! be annexed hereto. 
This Final Detennination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separ te, ndings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on .... · · . · . · :b . 
Distribution: Appeals Unit-Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) . 
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Appellant challenges the July 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 24-month hold. 
Appellant is serving an aggregate term of imprisonment of 2 2/3 to 8 years imprisonment 
after having been convicted of Criminal Possession of a Forged Instrument 2nd, and Criminal 
Impersonation.  Appellant was in possession of a forged certificate of liability insurance. 
Appellant raises the following issues in his brief: (1) the Board’s decision was arbitrary, 
capricious and irrational, made in violation of applicable legal authority, and placed too much 
emphasis on the crimes of conviction and community opposition to Appellant’s release; (2) the 
Board did not provide sufficient weight to Appellant’s achievements including his receipt of an 
Earned Eligibility Certificate (EEC) and certain low scores contained in his COMPAS instrument; 
(3) the Board failed to discuss certain issues with Appellant; (4) the Board’s decision was 
conclusory and lacked sufficient detail; (5) the Board’s decision was made in violation of 
Appellant’s due process rights; (6) the Board’s decision was made in violation of Appellant’s 5th
amendment rights; (7) community opposition letters should not have been considered by the 
Board; (8) letters soliciting parole recommendations from the sentencing court, district attorney 
and defense counsel need to be sent prior to each and every Board interview; (9) the Board’s 
decision was predetermined; and (10) the 24-month hold was excessive. 
 Appellant’s attorney refers to Appellant as “petitioner” in several places in the brief.  This 
is not correct. This is an administrative appeal and the inmate is properly referred to as “Appellant”. 
As to the first two issues, Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider 
criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s 
institutional record and criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).  While consideration of these factors is 
mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 
95 N.Y.2d 470, 477.  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is 
solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 
997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271; Matter of Garcia v. 
New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  
The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter 
of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of 
Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17.  In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board 
did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter 
of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of 
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McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); 
Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 
(3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128. 
Appellant’s receipt of an EEC does not automatically guarantee his release, and it does not 
eliminate consideration of the statutory factors including the instant offense.  Matter of Milling v. 
Berbary, 31 A.D.3d 1202, 1203, 819 N.Y.S.2d 373, 374 (4th Dept.), lv. denied, 7 N.Y.3d 808, 809, 
822 N.Y.S.2d 481 (2006); Matter of White v. Dennison, 29 A.D.3d 1144, 814 N.Y.S.2d 393 (3d 
Dept. 2006); Matter of Barad v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 275 A.D.2d 856, 713 N.Y.S.2d 
775, 776 (3d Dept. 2000), lv. denied, 96 N.Y.2d 702, 722 N.Y.S.2d 793 (2001).  Where an inmate 
has been awarded an EEC, the Board may deny release to parole on a finding that there is a 
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, the inmate will not live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law, and that his release is not compatible with the welfare of society.  
Correction Law §805; Matter of Heitman v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 214 A.D.2d 673, 625 
N.Y.S.2d 264 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Salcedo v. Ross, 183 A.D.2d 771, 771, 583 N.Y.S.2d 
502, 503 (1st Dept. 1992); Matter of Walker v. Russi, 176 A.D.2d 1185, 576 N.Y.S.2d 51 (3d 
Dept. 1991), appeal dismissed, 79 N.Y.2d 89 7, 581 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1992).  The standard set forth 
in Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) requiring consideration of whether the inmate’s release will so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law does not apply in cases 
where an EEC has been awarded.   
In 2011, the law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles 
to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 259–c(4); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 
§8002.2(a).  The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter 
of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also 
Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); 
Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 
2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 
2014).  Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a 
case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the instant 
offense.  The amendments also did not change the applicable substantive standards that the Board 
is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. See Executive Law 
§259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of 
King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, the COMPAS is an 
additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with applicable statutory factors. See 
Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 
2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); 
see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).  
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Furthermore, declining to afford the COMPAS controlling weight does not violate the 2011 
amendments.  Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).   
            
            As to the third issue, Appellant was provided the opportunity to discuss with the Board 
during the interview any issues of interest, and cannot now be heard to complain that certain issues 
were not discussed, or the extent to which certain issues were discussed. See Matter of Serna v. 
New York State Division of Parole, 279 A.D.2d 684, 719 N.Y.S. 2d 166  (3d Dept. 2001); Matter 
of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1st Dept. 1997).   
As to the fourth issue, the Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law 
§259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §8002.3(d), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the 
reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 
996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 
N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d 
Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 
881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
As to the fifth issue, an inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on 
parole before expiration of a valid sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & 
Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 
50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 
N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a 
possibility of parole” and thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the due 
process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. 
Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 
A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005).   
As to the sixth issue, the Board did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 
Constitution by giving consideration to actions for which Appellant has already been punished.  
The Board is obligated by law to consider the inmate’s crimes in every release decision.  Executive 
Law § 259-i(2)(c).  The Double Jeopardy Clause is not implicated because it applies to judicial 
proceedings, not parole matters:  
A denial of parole is a decision to withhold early release from the confinement 
component.  It is neither the imposition nor the increase of a sentence, and it is not 
punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause… [I]t is the original 
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criminal sentence that is limited by the Double Jeopardy Clause, not the 
administrative decision to grant early release from confinement.   
Alessi v. Quinlan, 711 F.2d 497, 501 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Bockeno v New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 227 A.D.2d 751, 642 N.Y.S.2d 97, 98 (3d Dept. 1996).  In other words, a denial of parole 
has the effect of perpetuating the status quo, i.e., continued incarceration during the term of the 
sentence, and does not give rise to multiple punishment for the same offense.   
  
 We note further that there is no legal requirement that the Board must examine whether 
there are any appeals of criminal convictions undertaken by Appellant.  Not surprisingly, Appellant 
offers no legal authority to support this claim.  
  
As to the seventh issue, the Board may receive and consider written communications from 
individuals, other than those specifically identified in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A), opposing an 
inmate’s release to parole supervision.  Matter of Applewhite v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 167 
A.D.3d 1380, --N.Y.S.3d-- (3d Dept. 2018) (“Contrary to petitioner’s contention, we do not find 
that [the Board’s] consideration of certain unspecified ‘consistent community opposition’ to his 
parole release was outside the scope of the relevant statutory factors that may be taken into account 
in rendering a parole release determination”); Matter of Clark v. New York Bd. of Parole, 166 
A.D.3d 531, 89 N.Y.S.3d 134 (1st Dept. 2018) (“the Board permissibly considered letters 
in opposition to the parole application submitted by public officials and members of the 
community”); Matter of Grigger v. New York State Div. of Parole, 11 A.D.3d 850, 852–53, 783 
N.Y.S.2d 689, 691 (3d Dept. 2004) (recognizing 259-i(2)(c)(A)(v)’s list is not the exclusive 
information the Board may consider and persons in addition to victims and their families may 
submit letters), lv. denied, 4 N.Y.3d 704, 792 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2005); see also Matter of Jordan v. 
Hammock, 86 A.D.2d 725, 447 N.Y.S.2d 44 (3d Dept. 1982) (letters from private citizens are 
protected and remain confidential); Matter of Rivera v. Evans, Index No. 0603-16, Decision & 
Order dated July 5, 2016 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Co.)(LaBuda A.J.S.C.) (recognizing “[c]onsideration 
of community or other opposition was proper under the statute” and the Board is required to keep 
identity of persons opposing release confidential), aff’d sub nom. Matter of Rivera v. Stanford, 53 
N.Y.S.3d 404, 149 A.D.3d 1445 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole., Index # 3699-2013, Order and Judgment dated October 25, 2013 (Devine J.S.C.)(Albany 
Co. Court)(no showing of prejudice by allegedly false information in PBA online petition where 
Board acknowledged public opposition during interview), aff’d, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 
714 (3d Dept. 2014); cf. Krebs v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, No. 9:08-CV-255NAMDEP, 2009 
WL 2567779, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2009) (public and political pressure “are permissible 
factors which parole officials may properly consider as they relate to ‘whether ‘release is not 
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incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of the offense 
as to undermine respect for the law’”); Morel v. Thomas, No. 02 CV 9622 (HB), 2003 WL 
21488017, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2003) (same); Seltzer v. Thomas, No. 03 CIV.00931 LTS FM, 
2003 WL 21744084, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2003) (same).   The same has also long been 
recognized as true with respect to letters supporting an inmate’s potential parole release.  See, e.g., 
Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d at 1273, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 719 
(3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Gaston v. Berbary, 16 A.D.3d 1158, 1159, 791 N.Y.S.2d 781, 782 (4th 
Dept. 2005); Matter of Torres v. New York State Div. of Parole, 300 A.D.2d 128, 129, 750 
N.Y.S.2d 759, 760 (1st Dept. 2002); Matter of Walker v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d 360, 362, 676 
N.Y.S.2d 52, 54 (1st Dept. 1998); cf. Cardenales v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 371, 371, 830 N.Y.S.2d 
152, 153 (1st Dept. 2007) (Board permissibly determined offense outweighed other positive 
factors including letters of support from, among others, victim’s mother).  Indeed, 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 
§8000.5(c)(2) refers to the security of letters either in support of or in opposition to an inmate’s 
release.; Matter of Costello v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 101 A.D.3d 1512, 957 N.Y.S.2d 486 
(3d Dept. 2012) (indicating Board considered Police Commissioner’s letter of opposition in original 
determination to grant open date), rev’d on other grounds 23 N.Y.3d 1002, 1004, 994 N.Y.S.2d 39 
(2014); Matter of LaBarbera v. New York State Div. of Parole, Index No. 12711/18, Decision/Order 
of Jan. 17, 2019 (Sup. Ct. Columbia Co.) (Mott, J.S.C.) (Board properly considered community 
opposition); Matter of Bottom v. Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, Index No. 902448-17, 
Judgment dated Jan. 10, 2018 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co.) (DeBow A.S.C.J.) (rejecting challenge to 
Board’s reliance on community opposition where majority of submissions addressed matters 
permitted by Executive Law and [per Duffy] there was no indication Board was influenced by 
improper objections predicated solely on victims’ police officer status); Matter of Bottom v. Dep't 
of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, Index No. 902448-17, Decision & Order dated Nov. 2, 2017 (Sup. 
Ct. Albany Co.) (DeBow A.S.C.J.) (recognizing Board may consider letters from private citizens 
while non-individualized objections based on class of crime would be improper); Matter of 
Comfort v. New York State Bd. of Parole, Index No. 3299-17, Decision & Order dated Oct. 27, 
2017 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co.) (Koweek A.S.C.J.) (rejecting challenge to community opposition and 
speculative allegation that Board considered erroneous information therein); Matter of Hayes v. 
New York State Bd. of Parole, Index No. 200-2017, Decision & Order dated May 3, 2017 (Sup. 
Ct. Sullivan) (Schick J.S.C.) (rejecting challenge to Board decision based on reliance on 
community opposition including by PBA); Matter of Reyes v. Stanford, Index No. 1674/2017, 
Decision, Order & Judgment dated Sept. 21, 2017 (Supt. Ct. Dutchess Co.) (Forman A.S.C.J.) 
(concluding community opposition is an appropriate factor the Board may consider but treated as 
harmless misstatement); Matter of Bailey v. New York State Div. of Parole, Index No. 973-16, 
Decision & Judgment dated Aug. 17, 2016 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co.) (Hartman A.J.S.C.) (rejecting 
challenge to Board decision based on reliance on letters generated by police officers’ union [even 
assuming letters contained inaccuracies or were inflammatory, Board would be permitted to 
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consider them for what they were worthy per Duffy and will be presumed not to have relied on 
inappropriate matters therein unless decision indicates otherwise]); Matter of Gordon v. Stanford, 
Index No. 788-16, Decision & Order dated June 17, 2016 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co.) (McGrath J.S.C.) 
(finding no error in Board’s consideration of community opposition, which was mentioned during 
interview), aff’d on other grounds Matter of Gordon v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1502, 50 N.Y.S.3d 
627 (3d Dept. 2017) (remaining claims unpreserved for review). 
  
As to the eighth issue, there is no requirement that letters soliciting parole recommendations 
from the sentencing court, district attorney and defense counsel need to be sent prior to each and 
every Board interview. 
As to the ninth issue, there is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to judges 
and administrative fact-finders.  See People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 
A.D.2d 914 (3d Dept. 1992).  The Board is presumed to have followed applicable statutory 
requirements and internal policies when making decisions regarding the suitability of an inmate’s 
possible release to parole supervision. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (2000).  There is no evidence 
that the Board’s decision was predetermined.  See Matter of Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of 
Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276 
A.D.2d 899 (3d Dept. 2000).   
As to the tenth issue, the Board has discretion to hold an inmate for a period of up to 24 
months. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b); Matter of Tatta v. State of 
N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002), lv. denied, 98 N.Y.2d 
604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278 (2002); Matter of Campbell v. Evans, 106 A.D.3d 1363, 965 N.Y.S.2d 672 
(3d Dept. 2013).  Therefore, the hold of 24 months was not excessive or improper. 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
